Abstract: With the advancement of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), states worldwide use it not only to better their people's living standards, but also as a tool of statecraft. Information operations, campaigns, and warfare have been used for ages. With the expansion of the Internet (57% of the world's population uses it), collection of data, and great power competition transfused, some states, such as China, use it to govern their people and export their digital authoritarianism globally. Further, Russia and China are engaged in information warfare with the West to gain the upper hand and adversely impact Western citizenry. In such a situation, growing cooperation and coordination between China and Russia, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, respectively, is occurring across military, geo-economic, geo-political, and strategic domains to alter the global order, which is proving to be a challenge for the West.
Problem statement: How to understand the role of information warfare in the era of the great power competition?
Bottom-Line-Up-Front: In the 21st century, the world is witnessing advanced modern warfare predicated on the growth of ICT and digital technologies. The digital age has compelled states to diversify tactics for potential future wars. Tactics, like information warfare, are being deployed to create unrest, confusion, and social disharmony in target states. Additionally, states could deploy various information warfare tactics and dominance in technology, vis-à-vis using military weapons, to secure geopolitical interests and objectives.
So What?: Advancements in ICT are providing opportunities for more people to connect to the Internet. This enhances the impact of information warfare, compelling states to engage in, and counter, more sophisticated information warfare tactics, undermining global stability. A clear example is the propagation of fake news or disinformation. Thus, ICT and information warfare must be used to minimize further disruption to the global order.
"Warfare has Re-Invaded Human Society"
Information is an important tool for a state to have an edge against its adversary during a conflict. Today, collecting information, and creating disinformation using information warfare (IW), has become an important tool for warfare strategy. IW is "any action to Deny, Exploit, Corrupt or Destroy the enemy's information and its functions, protecting ourselves against those actions and exploiting our own military information functions." Further, the rise of IW is connected with rapid advancements made in information and communication technology (ICT) over the last two decades.
IW is "any action to Deny, Exploit, Corrupt or Destroy the enemy's information and its functions, protecting ourselves against those actions and exploiting our own military information functions."
Today, as the role of technology in the civil and military domains becomes increasingly significant, the number of IW incidents has risen by 9% in the 21st century, as state and non-state actors are using it as a potent tool/weapon. ISIS and far-right groups in Europe have used IW tactics to expand their base and recruit more people. Similarly, states like Russia, China, and Iran sponsor and deploy IW tactics to achieve military or strategic gain.
Historically, information has helped states, kingdoms, and empires to devise strategies to combat adversaries. Advancements in technology since the 1990s, such as GPS and the Internet, have dual usability and expanded the use of IW. These developments, along with technology developed for commercial purposes, can be deployed in military tactics. Since IW includes a deliberate manipulation or use of information, its inherent unpredictability raises the potential for collateral damage and expands the threat to states and their populations in the 21st century.
As Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui argue, "Warfare has re-invaded human society in a more complex, extensive, concealed, and subtle manner with a reduction in military violence and principle of wars has shifted from using armed forces and using all other means to compel the enemy to accept one's interest."
In this regard, Russia's and China's IW strategy is meant to achieve their foreign policy objectives. In recent years, the great power cooperation under the Putin-Xi bonhomie has become a concern for the West.
IW: A Mystifying Battlespace in a Changing Global Order
The term "Information War" was first used by Thomas P. Rona in his paper 'Weapon Systems and Information War' in 1976. Since then, advancements in ICT and cyber warfare have made it necessary to differentiate between IW and cyber warfare. Although cyber warfare has been widely used in recent years, IW can even be found in Sun Tzu's "Art of War". Sun Tzu sees “all warfare is deception as it emphasizes using information aptly to gain an advantage against its adversary.”
All warfare is deception as it emphasizes using information aptly to gain an advantage against its adversary.
There have been various incidents in which IW was strategically used to gain the upper hand using military deception, command and control warfare (C2W), and psychological warfare. During the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783), George Washington used IW in his historic Valley Forge attack when he aptly manipulated the circumstances, misleading his counterpart, General Howe, to rush the bulk of his forces to Philadelphia. Similarly, to break the might of the German troops during the Second World War, the Allied Powers deceived German intelligence before the D-Day landing by staging an attack at an alternative site in South England.
In modern times, we find such deception and manipulative tactics in a non-military manner. Since 2013, Russia has been involved in influencing the Western democratic process to undermine the American people's faith in their democratic process and denigrate Hillary Clinton. Similarly, China used fake social media accounts to manipulate political discourse in Taiwan and promulgated disinformation during protests in Hong Kong. ISIS uses social media to amplify the effect of terror and recruit more people.
Chinese Emperor Qin Shi Huangdi (221-210 BCE) argued that the control of ideas is fundamentally important for a state's survival. This idea was echoed in third US President Thomas Jefferson's famous quote when he chose a government without a newspaper against a newspaper without a government. Today, states, such as China, use IW tactics — including imprisoning journalists — to create a favorable environment to maximize their control, power, and governance style, and manipulate and govern their people. In such situations, fake news, bots, and disinformation are used to manipulate voter activity to impact the election result, as evident in the election processes in South Asia (India and Pakistan) and Africa (Nigeria). Although print media is viewed as a credible source as compared to digital media, today's governments’ interference and regulation with respect to media have impacted media efficiency and credibility, allowing fake news to be circulated freely to gain political advantage during elections. Further, states use media to maintain their position and authority to manipulate the masses, as we find in Russian and Western media responses to the Russia-Ukraine War, Chinese media coverage during Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, and Indian and Chinese media biases during the border skirmishes near the Galwan Valley in 2020-2021.
Fake news, bots, and disinformation are used to manipulate voter activity to impact the election result, as evident in the election processes in South Asia and Africa.
As IW involves using and managing ICT in the battlespace to be competitive and gain a strategic advantage against opponents, it is difficult to tell when it starts and stops how destructive such campaigns will be for the target state. IW has transformed in practice and potential during the digital age, so information remains common in both IW and cyber warfare tactics. On the one hand, within IW, information is used as a weapon; on the other hand, cyber warfare engages exclusively in a digitized form, uses information as leverage, and targets an opponent's computer, software, and command and control system. The difference between IW and cyber warfare is based on operability, methods, tools, targets, and outcomes. IW is prospectively impactful and diffuses in its shape, and its effects are extensive, impacting diverse targets with no pattern of interconnection.
In recent years, IW has become a strategic tactic for the United States, reflected in the US using IW alongside allies against China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and countering Russian aggression and tactics in the Russia-Ukraine War. It thus raises an important question of cutting-off access to information in the digital world: The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, pushed the West to impose 8,330 sanctions against Russian individuals and 1,543 against Russian entities as of October 20, 2022. Further, to restrict Russia's disinformation campaign, the West imposed a ban on Sputnik and Kremlin-backed RT as they are viewed as propaganda outlets for the Russian government, reflecting a disservice to freedom of speech. The ban was viewed as the West's counter-IW tactic to silence the Russian viewpoint. Such an act raises flags of media bias and questionable journalistic ethics; the EU does not have the mandate to ban any media outlet. Banning a different perspective will only deepen the informational divides worldwide. With the rise of ICT and social media, wars today are fought on the digital battlefront, increasingly occurring on online platforms.
The growth in digital technologies, and the shift of 57% of the global population to the Internet, has made it easier to conduct IW over a greater distance, impacting a state's perception, approach, and military tactics. IW could take various forms in modern warfare and easily reach a wider targeted audience through electronic gadgets. It could influence a state's stock exchange transactions by creating a war-like scenario, impacting the state's economic credibility and resilience, or disinformation, causing political turmoil or civil unrest in the country. Further, IW impacts logistics and communication networks by overloading the infrastructure or spoofing it, disturbing the state's social fabric and harmony, and creating unrest, as seen during the Arab Spring in 2011 and recently in India during farmer protests in 2020-2021. IW has advanced in recent years and is being used as a weapon to deny, corrupt, exploit or destroy an adversary's information and function, making it imminent for a state to protect itself and its military information function.
IW could take various forms in modern warfare and easily reach a wider targeted audience through electronic gadgets. It could influence a state's stock exchange transactions by creating a war-like scenario, impacting the state's economic credibility and resilience, or disinformation, causing political turmoil or civil unrest in the country.
The rise of China and Chinese threats in the Indo-Pacific Region, and the emergence of the Russian threat in Europe, are the greatest geopolitical quagmires of the 21st century. Growing Russia-China ties worry policymakers in the West. In such circumstances, the way technology has developed in recent years further amplified the impact of IW on people’s lives and the governments’ ability to run a state, which, in turn, impacted the relations between states, undermining global order and stability. Such a development pushed the US to reclaim its dominance in the military and technological domains, as reflected in its Indo-Pacific Strategy. China has achieved this in recent years with the Chips 4 Alliance and CHIPS and Science Act to restrict technological dominance. To enhance its military position, it pushed for the restrengthening of NATO in Europe to counter the Russian threat.
In addition to the QUAD, the launch of I2U2 and AUKUS was meant to counter Chinese economic and military threats in the Indo-Pacific Region. Furthermore, the rise of new media and digital technologies like social media, applications, and easy accessibility of the Internet has impacted some regimes’ stability and dominance (e.g., Hijab protests in Iran), as well as the monopoly to project global influence and power. Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the US’ misuse of regime change and IW has led to the rise of unstable states in the Middle-East and North.
Moscow-Beijing's Great Power Cooperation and IW
Understanding Russia and China's growing cooperation hasn't only caused worry for the West and its possible impact on the global order. Still, it is evident in their "no-limit partnership." US-led military actions were legitimized to support US government actions and its viewpoints, such as subverting a targeted government, and were equated with freedom and democracy.
Instability, lack of infrastructure, and regional security issues in the Middle East allowed China and Russia to take advantage of the West's image in the region, as they were seen as more credible partners for many countries; for example, the “China-Iraq Oil for Construction Agreement”, or West Asian countries not adhering to the West’s sanctions against Russia owing to the war in Ukraine. Growing cooperation between China and Russia has improved their relation greatly. Moreover, the use of IW weapons and synchronization in their IW tactics has further alarmed the West.
The Dragon-Bear and IW
Considering Russia and China's relationship during the Cold War, the ties between Moscow and Beijing have improved since 2012 under President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin's leadership. As both countries developed strategic partnerships and cooperation, which were reflected in various domains from bilateral cooperation to UNSC resolutions, it did not result in a full-fledged alliance due to differences in geopolitical interests and asymmetries of power. However, such a situation does not prevent aligning interests, tactics, and means, as we see in IW, to address strategic issues and expand their influence worldwide. The meeting between Xi Jinping and Putin on the sidelines of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics signaled that their relationship had entered a new era. As the joint statement emphasized, there is a need to reshape the international order, and such development could be achieved through a strategy that centers on "information."
Considering Russia and China's relationship during the Cold War, the ties between Moscow and Beijing have improved since 2012 under President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin's leadership.
Historically, militaries have used information campaigns, along with the conventional method of warfare, to gain an advantage against adversaries. States possessing a superior capability and advantage in information campaigns and operations succeed in the initial period of war and can protect any strategic interest, as evident in Russia's IW tactics in the Russia-Ukraine War and China's response to Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan. As Russia and China did not want US interference in their internal affairs, they increased their cooperation from economic to military and technological collaboration; this was reflected in the 2001 Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, which extends till 2027. As the US argued, China and Russia are using technology and IW tactics against their adversaries and restricting internet freedom at home to expand their control further and legitimize their actions and methods abroad.
The expansion of the internet not only made people's lives easy, it further opened new challenges for states to maintain their image domestically and globally. Consequently, the collection of data and the compulsion of installment of such infrastructure by companies like Facebook and Twitter have become critical for the states. In this regard, acceptance of IW as part of states’ warfare tactics and domestic policy has become a priority for authoritarian and democratic governments alike.
When Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, China used its digital supremacy to spread rumors, conducted its largest military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, and breached the median, causing the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. However, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen viewed the Chinese information assault against her country as "cognitive warfare tactics." As Tsai argues, China has been using "United Front Work" for a long time to push Taiwanese people to join mainland China willingly, or Beijing will ensure a divided and unhappy Taiwan, which will be an easier target for China.
When Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, China used its digital supremacy to spread rumors, conducted its largest military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, and breached the median, causing the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis.
With growing US-China competition and Taiwan as a Faultline in the Sino-US relationship, continued political pressure from China is a point of contention between the US and China. This was reflected in US President Joe Biden's recent statement regarding defending Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. With Taiwan's economy being only five percent of that of China, it continues to remain a victim of China's economic statecraft, as China uses its economic size to influence other countries. To counter this, Taiwanese President Tsai argues, "you would not put all your eggs in one basket," indicating Taiwan is restructuring its Chinese-dependent economic structure to reduce its economic dependence on China and develop economic resilience. Since August 2022, China has started using a new influence operation against Taiwan. This was a divergence from its traditional messaging, as China began using new types of digital platforms, such as Reddit, to push its image of a peaceful unification of Taiwan with mainland China.
Similarly, Russia is engaged in strategic propaganda campaigns against Ukraine, using social media extensively to justify its narrative of an offensive-defensive approach to a conflict that has caused much damage to life and property. Russia and China have used information to establish firm domestic control through manipulation and censorship to achieve 'digital authoritarianism' and cooperation in IW. This has allowed them to export their model to other countries.
The Russian military employs a hybrid approach to control and shape information by integrating ‘special operation forces’ and non-kinetic measures under its hybrid warfare model. Russia never hesitates to use hybrid warfare, as in the Russo-Georgia War and now in the Russia-Ukraine war. Although mechanized warfare remains vital in the Russia-Ukraine War, IW has become a vital aspect of Russian military strategy. However, Ukraine's ability to reclaim its territory with Western assistance reflects a weakness in Russian might and keeps the nuclear threat alive.
Russia never hesitates to use hybrid warfare, as in the Russo-Georgia War and now in the Russia-Ukraine war.
A March 2022 White Paper released by the China People's Liberation Army (PLA) titled 'Grasp the new essence of "winning the good with bad" in the Information Age" outlined IW as a priority for China. Therefore, IW has taken a central role and priority over conventional military strength within Chinese military strategy. As the paper argues, warfare has shifted from a mechanized battle to an information assault, and there is a need to suppress an adversary's information superiority to have an edge.
Advancements in ICT have increased the relevance of surveillance technology for all states. China’s technological dominance makes it easy for Chinese companies like ZTE, Huawei, Dahua, China National Electronics Import and Export Corporation (CEIEC), and Hikvision to export such technology to democratic and autocratic countries. Such developments reflect a "push and pull" factor. The export of such technology gives China greater strategic leverage over the West. Beijing views ICT as vital to ensuring economic growth and development in pursuit of the efficient implementation of Chinese foreign policy and strategy. In recent years, a growing dependence on surveillance technology platforms for public and national security caused a rise in the export of such products from China. Thus, exporting such technology platforms to democracies and autocracies raises strategic concerns, as it could give rise to the export of the Chinese version of digital authoritarianism globally.
Further, Russia and China have continued to coordinate IW tactics in the Russia-Ukraine war. These include Russia suppressing information about the war to a domestic audience and peddling disinformation abroad and in Ukraine. China not only followed Russia in releasing misinformation regarding the war, but also censored war-related information at home; it presented Russia's view on the war, while words like war and invasion were banned. Such collaboration and further learning from one another was also part of Russia using IW tactics as a 'sharp-power tool' during the 2014 Georgia War to occupy South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Later, Russia expanded its influence in Africa and Latin America. China deployed a similar tactic with its coercive and covert sharp power approach towards Taiwan, Europe, South America, and some parts of Southeast Asia. Since 2016 both authoritarian countries have come closer strategically than ever before, as they view their relationship as a "comprehensive strategic partnership."
China not only followed Russia in releasing misinformation regarding the war, but also censored war-related information at home; it presented Russia's view on the war, while words like war and invasion were banned.
The growing Russia-China strategic relationship is reflected in the Vostok 2022 military exercise. Against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine War, growing China-Russia strategic cooperation and China's dominance in ICT development assisted Russia in deploying its IW tactics effectively. China's top four outlets—CGTN, Global Times, T-House, and Xinhua News—extensively promoted Russia's IW tactics while ensuring its digital authoritarianism remained intact. Currently, along with the great power competition, Russia and China are further engaged in IW against the US, using military application with other tools to defend and advance their national interests at home and abroad.
IW and the Future Ahead
As the information domain has become a critical aspect in modern warfare, the growing Russia-China nexus has cautioned the West as it has to counter both countries across the military and technological domains. The Internet will continue to expand throughout the 21st century, transforming IW tactics and operations. With growing great power competition and changing global order, China went all-in with Russia to create disinformation, which is reflected in the social media giants’ inability to stop it (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube). The military application of information will only expand in the coming years, destabilizing the global order further. China and Russia are aware of such a situation and exhibit this in their IW tactics.
The military application of information will only expand in the coming years, destabilizing the global order further. China and Russia are aware of such a situation and exhibit this in their IW tactics.
Moreover, closer cooperation between Russia and China to counter the US, and their relationship with Iran and North Korea, have obliged states worldwide not to take enemy IW lightly, which is reflected well in the recent annual US Director of National Intelligence Report. With increasing global dependence on the Internet and its use by governments and the public, a state's IW capabilities and operation is needed to secure its national interest and stability at home.
Kashif Anwar; research interests: China, the US, India and geostrategy, geoeconomics, military technology, and geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific region. Previously, he has published papers in The Financial Express, The Defence Horizon Journal, and The Rise, and holds an M.Phil in International Studies. The views contained in this article are the author's alone and do not represent the views of the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS).
 Andrew Borden, “What is IW?,” Air University, accessed on September 22, 2022, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Chronicles/borden.pdf.
 Christopher Whyte, A Trevor Thrall, and Brian M. Mazanec, IW in the Age of Cyber Conflict (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2021), 3.
 Mick Ryan, War Transformed (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2022), 62.
 “IW: Manipulation of Information in a War,” Unrevealed Files, March 29, 2022, accessed on August 29, 2022, https://www.unrevealedfiles.com/information-warfare-manipulation-of-information-in-a-war/.
 Whyte, 2.
 James Deane, “Media and communication in governance: It’s time for a rethink,” OECD, 2015, accessed on September 25, 2022, https://www.oecd.org/dac/accountable-effective-institutions/Governance%20Notebook%203.4%20Deane.pdf.
 “IW, disinformation and electoral fraud,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, June 2019, accessed on September 24, 2022, https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/cybercrime/module-14/key-issues/information-warfare--disinformation-and-electoral-fraud.html.
 “Total number of list-based sanctions imposed by Australia, Canada, the European Union (EU), France, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States on Russia from February 22 to September 7, 2022, by target,” Statista, September, 2022, accessed on September 27, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293531/western-sanctions-imposed-on-russia-by-target/.
 Nandita Haskar, “Opinion: The West’s ban on the Kremlin-backed RT news channel is a disservice to freedom of speech,” Scroll, March 18, 2022, accessed on September 27, 2022, https://scroll.in/article/1019670/opinion-the-wests-ban-on-the-kremlin-backed-rt-news-channel-is-a-disservice-to-freedom-of-speech.
 Jamie Wiseman, “Banning Russia Today? There are actually difficulties,” EuObserver, March 04, 2022, accessed on September 27, 2022, https://euobserver.com/opinion/154484.
 Whyte, 2.
 Nathaniel Greenberg, “How IW Shaped the Arab Spring: The politics of narrative in Tunisia and Egypt,” (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2019), 34. Also, see Devsena Mishra, “Changing Dimensions of IW,” Vivekananda International Foundation, January 27, 2022, accessed on September 02, 2022, https://www.vifindia.org/article/2022/january/27/changing-dimensions-of-information-warfare.
 Col Andrew Borden, USAF (Ret.), “What is IW?,” Air University, accessed on August 29, 2022, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Chronicles/borden.pdf.
 Greg Simons, “The Evolution of Regime Change and IW in the 21st Century,” Journal of International Analytics, Vol 11, No 4 (2020): 73.
 Lee Ying Shan, “‘No limits’ relationship between China and Russia has limitations, professor says,” CNBC, accessed on September 17, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/16/china-russia-ties-unequal-partnership-as-xi-putin-meet-says-prof.html.
 “China cements influence in Iraq through oil, infrastructure,” Times of India, August 22, 2022, accessed on August 30, 2022, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/international-business/china-cements-influence-in-iraq-through-oil-infrastructure-deals/articleshow/93709009.cms.
 Kashif Anwar, “I2U2 and its Significance in the Indo-Pacific Region,” The Rise, July 27, 2022, accessed on August 30, 2022, https://therise.co.in/12446/i2u2-and-its-significance-in-the-indo-pacific-region/.
Dmitry Gorenburg, “An Emerging Strategic Partnership: Trends in Russia-China Military Cooperation,” George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, April, 2020, accessed on August 31, 2022, https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/emerging-strategic-partnership-trends-russia-china-military-cooperation-0.
 David Bandurski, “China and Russia are joining forces to spread disinformation,” Brookings, March 11, 2022, accessed on August 31, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/china-and-russia-are-joining-forces-to-spread-disinformation/.
 Eric Jacobson, “Sino-Russian Convergence in the Military Domain,” CSIS, March 22, 2018, accessed on August 31, 2022, https://www.csis.org/npfp/sino-russian-convergence-military-domain.
 Bandurski, 21.
 A. A. Bastian, “China Is Stepping Up Its Information War on Taiwan,” Foreign Policy, August 02, 2022, accessed on August 31, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/02/china-pelosi-taiwan-information/.
 Kenddrick Chanand Mariah Thornton, “China’s Changing Disinformation and Propaganda Targeting Taiwan,” The Diplomat, September 19, 2022, accessed on September 27, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/chinas-changing-disinformation-and-propaganda-targeting-taiwan/.
 Frances Mao, “Biden again says US would defend Taiwan if China attacks,” BBC News, September 19, 2022, accessed on September 27, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-62951347.
 TszWang (Sam) Yeung, “Throwing a straw against the wind? How Taiwan responds to China’s economic statecraft,” China Focus, June 21, 2021, accessed on September 27, 2022, https://chinafocus.ucsd.edu/2021/06/21/throwing-a-straw-against-the-wind-how-taiwan-responds-to-chinas-economic-statecraft/.
Christian Perez, “IW in Russia’s War in Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, August 22, 2022, accessed on August 31, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/22/information-warfare-in-russias-war-in-ukraine/.
 Jean-Baptiste, Jeangene Vilmer and Paul Charon, “Russia as a Hurricane, China as a Climate Change: Different Ways of IW,” War on the Rocks, January 21, 2020, accessed on August 31, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/russia-as-a-hurricane-china-as-climate-change-different-ways-of-information-warfare/.
 Mark Grzegorzewski and Christopher Marsh, “Incorporating the cyberspace domain: How Russia and China exploit asymmetric advantage in great power competition,” Modern War Institute at West Point, March 15, 2021, accessed on September 02, 2022, https://mwi.usma.edu/incorporating-the-cyberspace-domain-how-russia-and-china-exploit-asymmetric-advantages-in-great-power-competition/.
 Bastian, 24.
 Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Dealing with demand for China’s global surveillance exports,” Brookings, April 2020, accessed on September 27, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200428_china_surveillance_greitens_v3.pdf.
 Joshua Kurlantzick, “How Russia and China Learn From Each Other on Disinformation,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 07, 2022, accessed on September 01, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-russia-and-china-learn-each-other-disinformation.
 Ralph Jennings, “China Dictates Messaging About What's Happening in Ukraine,” VoaNews, accessed on September 19, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-dictates-messaging-about-what-s-happening-in-ukraine-/6474752.html.
 Guihai Guan, “Thirty years of China–Russia strategic relations: achievements, characteristics and prospects,” China International Strategy Review, May 13, 2022, accessed on September 01, 2022, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s42533-022-00101-6.pdf; Also, see Gui Congyou, “Deepen China-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Coordination and Jointly Create A New Chapter of Win-Win Cooperation,” Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, accessed on September 01, 2022, http://www.cpifa.org/en/cms/book/204.
 Elizabeth Dwoskin, “China is Russia's most powerful weapon for IW,” Washington Post, April 08, 2022, accessed on September 01, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/04/08/russia-china-disinformation/.
 Grzegorzewski, 31.
 Dwoskin, 41.
 Bandurski, 21. Also see, Dwoskin, n.39. Also See, Grzegorzewski, n.31.
 Patrick Diotte, “The Big Four and Cyber Espionage: How China, Russia, Iran and North Korea Spy Online,” Canadian Military Journal, accessed on October 31, 2022, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol20/no4/PDF/CMJ204Ep32.pdf.